Salgbc Disciplinary Collective Agreement

`32 Extension of the collective agreement concluded within the Council of Collective Agreements [17] If it is intended to replace Article 32, it is manifestly contrary to the mandatory requirements of Article 32(71)(3) of the ASM does not provide for: (a) written extension and (b) approval at a meeting of the bargaining council. The RFPs in clause 4.2 acknowledge the provisions of section 32. Section 210 of the LRA provides that in the event of a conflict that that jurisdiction does not respect in the present case, with respect to matters dealt with in the LRA, between the LRA and the provisions of another law other than the Constitution or a law that expressly amends the LRA, the provisions of the ARA take precedence. It is also for this reason that the provisions of Article 32 take precedence. In this regard, the arbitrator correctly found that section 32 of the LRA applied and that its provisions were not met for the terms of the collective agreement to apply to MATUSA and its members. [10] Let`s turn to the benefits of verification. As always, the starting block is the constitution of the Republic of South Africa. For the purposes of this judgment, Section 23 is a good starting point. Within the meaning of Article 23(2), every worker has the right to form and join a trade union. On this basis, it is clear that the right to join a trade union is an individual right of workers. This individual right of workers is linked to the right to freedom of association.

Once again, the right to connect freely is an individual right. The last place to consider is section 23, paragraph 5, which makes each trade union lose the right to conduct collective bargaining. National legislation may be adopted to govern collective bargaining. [21] The arbitrator preferred an interpretation that does not infringe the fundamental rights of MATUSA and its members. Such an interpretation cannot be criticised by an examining court. Recognising that there is no application for annulment of the provisions of the collective agreement before me, the Court of Justice is not in a position to declare any of these provisions invalid and legally unenforceable. I disagree with the assertion that the arbitrator has declared the MOU or its impugned clauses illegal and has therefore entered an area over which it is not entitled. Their conclusion was simply that the MOU could not be applied to MATUSA and its members. It is commonplace that no law should restrict a right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Any interpretation different from that chosen by the arbitrator in this case would infringe the fundamental rights of MATUSA and its members. The applicant refers to the Court`s judgment in Solidarity/SAPS and Others[14].

That judgment is distinct from the present case. At first instance, at Solidarity, the applicant obstructed the provisions of the LRA and relied directly on the Bill of Rights. In Casu, the second defendant, having the right to interpret or regularize the application of the collective agreement, was a task authorized to it under Article 24 of the LRA, within the meaning and purpose of the Constitution of the Republic. . . .

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